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Two studies examined correlates of belief in a Jewish conspiracy theory among Malays in
Malaysia, a culture in which state-directed conspiracism as a means of dealing with per-
ceived external and internal threats is widespread. In Study 1, 368 participants from Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, completed a novel measure of belief in a Jewish conspiracy theory,
along with measures of general conspiracist ideation, and anomie. Initial analysis showed
that the novel scale factorially reduced to a single dimension. Further analysis showed
that belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was only significantly associated with gen-
eral conspiracist ideation, but the strength of the association was weak. In Study 2, 314
participants completed the measure of belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory, along with
measures of general conspiracist ideation, and ideological attitudes. Results showed that
belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was associated with anti-Israeli attitudes, modern
racism directed at the Chinese, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orien-
tation. General conspiracist ideation did not emerge as a significant predictor once other
variables had been accounted for.These results suggest that there may be specific cultural
and social psychological forces that drive belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory within the
Malaysian context. Specifically, belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory among Malaysian
Malays appears to serve ideological needs and as a mask for anti-Chinese sentiment, which
may in turn reaffirm their perceived ability to shape socio-political processes.
Keywords: conspiracy theories, anti-semitism, modern racism, monological belief system, Malaysia
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF CONSPIRACY
THEORIES: THE CASE OF THE JEWISH CONSPIRACY THEORY
IN MALAYSIA
In recent years, scholars have paid increasing attention to beliefs
in false narratives that exaggerate, idealize, or misconstrue real-
ity, such as beliefs in myths of science (Swami et al., 2012b) and
pseudo-history (Allchin, 2004). A related aspect of this litera-
ture concerns belief in conspiracy theories, defined as a subset
of false narratives in which the ultimate cause of an event is
believed to be due to a malevolent plot by multiple actors work-
ing together (Goldberg, 2001; Barkun, 2003; Bale, 2007; Swami
and Furnham, 2012a). Although this definition of a conspir-
acy theory is not exhaustive, it does capture the crux of most
such beliefs, including the suggestion that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) were responsible for the assassination of John F.
Kennedy and that the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were
allowed to happen by high-ranking officials in the United States
government.
The study of conspiracy theories deserves greater coverage for a
number of reasons. First, they appear to be relatively widespread:
since the early 1990s, for example, polls have consistently indicated
that upwards of 70% of Americans believe some form of conspir-
acy was responsible for President Kennedy’s death (Goertzel, 1994;
McHoskey, 1995; Southwell and Twist, 2004). Second, the out-
comes of belief in conspiracy theories for civic society is, at best,
currently uncertain. On the one hand, some scholars believe that
conspiracy theories should be viewed as cultural practices that
afford citizens opportunities to address the credibility of gover-
nance (Sasson, 1995; Fenster, 1999; Hellinger, 2003) or as attempts
by lay individuals to create“naïve deconstructionist history”(Rud-
min, 2003). On the other hand, because the critique of power
offered by conspiracy theories is often simplistic, they are suscep-
tible to racist and exclusionary narratives, which in turn create
discord and public mistrust (Fenster, 1999; Miller, 2002; Räikkä,
2008).
In this light, it is perhaps unsurprising that scholars have called
for increased attention into the psychology of conspiracy theo-
ries (Swami and Coles, 2010), particularly the functions served by
these narratives. Until relatively recently, much of the extant liter-
ature on conspiracy theories had been dominated by Hofstadter’s
(1966) seminal discussion of “paranoid styles” in American pol-
itics, in which he attempted to describe “political personalities”
that subscribed to right-wing conspiracy theories in clinical terms.
Influenced by Hofstadter, many scholars came to view conspiracy
theorists as paranoid and delusional; that is, conspiracy theories
were viewed as the products of extreme paranoia, delusional think-
ing, and narcissism (see Robins and Post, 1997). This individual or
collective pathology was thought to effectively stunt any form of
socio-political action by conspiracy theorists (Groh, 1987), which
in turn heightened their paranoia.
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Recent work has provided some support for the idea that con-
spiracy theorists have particular personality profiles marked by
paranoia and delusional thinking. For example, two studies have
reported that belief in conspiracy theories is positively associated
with schizotypal tendencies, that is, the tendency to be suspicious,
paranoid, and experience magical thinking and unusual beliefs
(Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., submitted). In addition, belief in
conspiracy theories has also been found to correlate positively with
paranormal beliefs (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011), that
is beliefs in processes for which there is currently little supportive
empirical evidence. Even so, the lens of psychopathology has been
critiqued as being reductionist and purely descriptive, as it fails
to consider the influence of political structures on conspiracist
ideation (Gray, 2008; see also Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009).
Rather, recent work on conspiracy theories has borrowed from
Marx’s theory of alienation (see Parry, 1969) to argue that such
narratives emerge at times when individuals feel powerless, dis-
advantaged, or voiceless (Waters, 1997; Fenster, 1999; Pratt, 2003;
Whitson and Galinsky, 2008). More specifically, it is argued that
some phenomena, such as terrorist attacks, are difficult to compre-
hend, emotive, lack reliable explanatory frameworks, and remove
individual agency (Kravitz, 1999; Parker, 2001; Swami and Furn-
ham, 2012a). In such cases, conspiracy theories help to simplify
those phenomena and offer a coherent explanation that may not
otherwise be forthcoming. Moreover, by personifying the agents
of a conspiracy, conspiracist narratives may allow individuals to
reaffirm their ability to shape the socio-political process. In so
doing, conspiracy theories serve to ameliorate feelings of power-
lessness and fill a need for certainty and control (Miller, 2002; Pratt,
2003; Leman, 2007; Swami and Coles, 2010; Swami and Furnham,
2012a).
Based on this perspective, a number of recent studies have
focused on individual difference factors that make belief in con-
spiracy theories more likely. For example, there is evidence that
conspiracist ideation is associated with a range of individual dif-
ference traits that signify individual and political anomie. Thus,
studies have reported significant associations between belief in
conspiracy theories and low self-esteem, feelings of powerless-
ness, distrust in authority, and political cynicism (Goertzel, 1994;
Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Swami et al., 2010, 2011). In this view,
the alienation felt or experienced by some members of society lead
them to adopt conspiracy theories as a means of explaining and
understanding their relative powerlessness while simultaneously
affording them a means of addressing that imbalance (Swami and
Furnham, 2012a).
Although anomie figures prominently in the extant literature
on conspiracy theories, it is by no means the only explanation.
Goertzel (1994) has suggested that conspiracy theories form part
of a “monological belief system,” such that the adoption of a con-
spiracist worldview makes the assimilation of novel conspiracy
theories more likely. In support of this perspective, recent stud-
ies have indicated that a conspiracist worldview is associated with
stronger belief in specific and newly emerging conspiracy theories
(Swami et al., 2010, submitted; Swami and Furnham, 2012b), as
well as fictional conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2011), even if
such narratives contain internal contradictions (Wood et al., in
press). According to Goertzel (1994), different conspiracy theories
support each other and, through their assimilation, a conspiracist
explanation is preferred for any event requiring explanation.
Although this body of work continues to grow, an important
limitation is that the associations between conspiracist ideation
and individual difference variables have only been studied among
Western populations. This is an important oversight because,
although conspiracy theories exist in many cultures worldwide
(Groh, 1987; Zonis and Joseph, 1994; Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2004), the extant literature has not examined antecedents of con-
spiracist ideation among non-Western populations. It is possible
that conspiracy theories fulfill different roles as a function of local
identity, culture, or the geopolitical context (Ashraf, 1997; Gray,
2008). For example, variations in the way in which different groups
interpret and understand the same event (e.g., the denial of the
negative impacts of slavery in the United States; Milburn and Con-
rad, 1996) suggest that local identities are important in terms of
understanding conspiracy theories (Knight, 2000).
To overcome the dearth of research on conspiracy theories
among non-Western populations, the present study sought to
examine antecedents of the Jewish conspiracy theory in Malaysia.
This particular conspiracy theory is far-ranging but generally
borrows from early European anti-Semitism and posits a Jewish
conspiracy for world domination (Johnson, 1987; Glaeser, 2005).
In Malaysia, although this conspiracy was not created de novo
(Reid, 2010), it has been fueled in particular by a sense of Mus-
lim victimhood and defeat (Suciu, 2008). Furthermore, although
the content of this conspiracy theory shares similarities with Mid-
dle Eastern and early European anti-Semitism (Schulze, 2006),
there are a number of context-specific factors that help explain
the prominence of the conspiracy theory in Malaysia (and neigh-
boring Indonesia; Siegel, 2000; Burhanuddin, 2007). First is the
absence of an established Jewish population in the region, which
has given rise to an imagined or “perceived Jew” (as opposed to
the “real Jew” depicted as living in Israel or among the Dias-
pora), whose influence takes various forms. More specifically, it has
been suggested that anti-Jewish conspiracy theorizing in Malaysia
and Indonesia reflects displaced resentment of minority Chinese
(Siegel, 2000; Hadler, 2004; Burhanuddin, 2007): because gov-
ernment policy ostensibly forbids the expression of anti-Chinese
sentiment, resentment of the Chinese minority may have found a
voice through anti-Semitism directed at Jews.
Second, and unlike Western Europe and the United States where
Jewish conspiracy theories tend to be limited to extremist groups
(Billig, 1978, 1988, 1989; Fielding, 1981; Copsey, 2004), the con-
spiracist narrative about Jews is both widespread and public in
Malaysia. Indeed, one characteristic of Malaysian conspiracism
is the role of the state in narrating and perpetuating conspiracy
theories (Reid, 2010). For example, ex-prime minister Mahathir
Mohamad frequently raised the specter of Jewish world domi-
nation as an argument for Muslim unity (e.g., in relation to the
economic crisis of the late 1990s and the issue of Palestine), Malay
translations of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Mein Kampf
are widely available, and Holocaust denial is widespread even
among academics (see Reid, 2010). Moreover, the loss of legitimacy
of the ruling party post-Mahathir has made popular anti-Jewish
racism as a means of diverting attention away from the state’s
political failings and constructing an imagined enemy (Chirot and
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Reid, 1997; Reid, 2010; for a similar discussion in relation to the
Middle East, see Gray, 2008).
It should be noted, however, that the label “Jew” is also fre-
quently, though implicitly, applied to a range of broader enemies,
including secularism, cosmopolitanism, globalization, American-
ism, and capitalism and world banking (Bowen, 2006; Reid,
2010). As such, although directed explicitly at a community
that does not exist in Malaysia, the Jewish conspiracy theory
affords Malay-Muslim agents a means of implicitly scapegoat-
ing ethnic minorities and unifying Muslims around a political
argument about threats to nationhood (see also Cohn-Sherbok,
2002). As has been discussed in relation to Syria, state-directed
misinformation has the effect of strengthening popular nation-
alism, forcing opposition commentators to justify themselves
through non-arguments, and reinforcing the state as a source
of protection against an external threat (Wedeen, 1999). In
short, it is quite possible that, in the context of Malaysia, the
Jewish conspiracy theory fulfills context-specific needs among
Malays.
The present study sought to investigate this possibility through
two studies conducted among Malaysian Malays, the majority
ethnic group in Malaysia. Study 1 conducted a preliminary exam-
ination of associations between belief in the Jewish conspiracy
and variables related to anomie that have been included in previ-
ous studies. This study also examined Goertzel’s (1994) suggestion
that conspiracy theories form part of a monological belief system.
Study 2 extended the results of the first study by examining associ-
ations between belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory and a range
of ideological variables. Although largely exploratory, the present
work was driven by a motivation to examine the extent to which
antecedents of conspiracist ideation identified in the West would
remain stable in a non-Western setting.
STUDY 1
Examining belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory is hampered by
the lack of a suitable scale for the measurement of such a belief.
As such, a first step of Study 1 was to construct an appropri-
ate measure of belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory. A second
step was the examination of associations between belief in the
Jewish conspiracy theory and a range of individual difference fac-
tors that have been utilized in previous work (Goertzel, 1994;
Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Swami et al., 2010, 2011). Specifi-
cally, Study 1 included measures of general conspiracist ideation
(to test the hypothesis that conspiracy theories are monological
in nature) and attitudes to authority, political cynicism, politi-
cal alienation, self-esteem, and satisfaction with life (to test the
suggestion that conspiracist ideation reflects feelings of anomie).
Based on the above review of the literature, it was expected that
belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory would be significantly
associated with general conspiracist ideation and measures of
anomie.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethical statement
The ethics committee at the Department of Psychology, University
of Westminster, specifically approved this study. All participants
provided written informed consent.
Participants
Participants of this study were 180 women and 188 men of Malay
ancestry. Although Malaysia is ethnically heterogeneous, ethnic
Malays make up a slight majority of the population (about 51%)
and play a dominant role politically (by comparison, ethnic Chi-
nese make up about 24% of the population). By constitutional
definition, all Malays are Muslims who are required to adhere
to Malay-Islamic customs. All participants were recruited from
Kuala Lumpur, the capital and largest city in Malaysia. Partici-
pants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (M = 44.15, SD= 12.90).
In terms of educational qualifications, 40.8% had completed sec-
ondary schooling, 34.2% had a post-secondary diploma, 19.8%
had an undergraduate degree,and 5.2% had a postgraduate degree.
Materials
Belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory. A novel scale was con-
structed to measure belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory. One
item was adapted from Eysenck’s (1953) measure of opinions of
the Jews and further items were constructed based on sources con-
cerning the Jewish conspiracy theory in Southeast Asia (e.g., Chirot
and Reid, 1997; Reid, 2010).Redundant items were excluded prior
to data collection, leaving a final measure consisting of 12 items
(see Table 1) that were rated on a seven-point Likert-type scale
(1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree). The factor structure of
the novel scale is reported in the Section “Results and Discussion”
below.
Conspiracist ideation. The Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inven-
tory (Swami et al., 2010, 2011) was used to measure general
conspiracist ideation. This is a 15-item measure that describes
a range of prominent and internationally recognizable conspiracy
theories. (Sample item: “A powerful and secretive group, known
as the New World Order, are planning to eventually rule the world
through an autonomous world government, which would replace
sovereign governments.”) The scale does not contain any items
relating to Jewish conspiracy theories. All items were rated on a
nine-point Likert-type scale (1= completely false, 9= completely
true) and an overall score was computed as the mean of all items.
Higher scores on this scale reflect greater belief in conspiracy the-
ories. Previous work has shown that this scale is one-dimensional
and has good internal consistency (Swami et al., 2010, 2011). In
addition, the scores on the scale correlate strongly with scores
from a non-event based, generic measure of conspiracist ideation
(r = 0.88; Brotherton et al., 2012). In the present work, Cronbach’s
α for this scale was 0.90.
Attitudes to authority. To measure attitudes to authority, this
study used Reicher and Emler’s (1985) Attitudes to Authority Scale,
which was adapted by Swami et al. (2010) to exclude items refer-
ring to fairness of school rules. The adapted measure consists of 10
items that relate to institutional authority, bias by those in author-
ity, and the absolute priority of rules. (Sample item: “The main
purpose of the law is to keep things as they are in a society that
favors the rich.”) All items were rated on a five-point Likert-type
scale (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree) and an overall score
was computed as the mean of all items following reverse-coding
of some items. Higher scores on this scale reflect more negative
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Table 1 | Items and factor loadings of the novel measure of belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory from Study 1.
Items Factor 1 Factor 2
(1) Jews have too much power and influence in the world 0.90 0.17
(2) World banking is dominated by Jewish families 0.88 0.20
(3) Jews use their positions in world news media to foster a pro-Jewish agenda 0.81 0.34
(4) Jews have caused economic crises in this country for their own ends 0.76 0.22
(5) Jews are to blame for the detrimental effects of globalization in this country 0.74 0.12
(6) Jews are attempting to establish a secret world government 0.72 0.31
(7) Jews are secretly running the United States government in collaboration with Israel 0.69 0.12
(8) Jews are manipulating capitalism for their own ends 0.66 0.17
(9) The Holocaust is a myth fabricated to serve Jewish interests 0.58 0.18
(10) Jews are responsible for the social and moral ills in this country 0.52 0.87
(11) Jews are using political groups and organizations to destabilize this country 0.45 0.76
(12) Organizations such as the Freemasons are a means for Jews to establish a secret world government 0.39 0.69
Items were rated on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1= strongly agree, 7= strongly disagree). Items were presented in a random order in the survey.
attitudes to authority. This adaptation of the scale has been shown
to have adequate internal consistency (Swami et al., 2010, 2011).
Cronbach’s α for this measure was 0.72.
Political cynicism. The 13-item Political Cynicism Scale (Citrin
and Elkins, 1975) was used to measure concern for public interest,
idealism, and political determination. (Sample item: “Most politi-
cians are really willing to be truthful to the voters.”) All items were
rated on an Agree-Disagree format (1= agree, 2= disagree) and
an overall score was computed as the sum of all items following
reverse-coding of some items. Higher scores on this scale indicate
greater political cynicism. The Political Cynicism Scale has good
internal consistency and patterns of validity (Citrin and Elkins,
1975). Cronbach’s α for this measure was 0.78.
Political alienation. To measure political alienation, Malik’s
(1982) Political Alienation Scale was used. This scale consists of five
items (sample item:“Sometimes governmental and political affairs
look so complex that I am unable to understand them”) that mea-
sure an individual’s sense of political efficacy and attitudes toward
the political system. Items were rated on an Agree-Disagree for-
mat (1= disagree, 2= agree) and an overall score was computed
as the sum of all items following reverse-coding of some items.
Higher scores on this scale indicate greater political alienation.
Malik (1982) reported that the scale has good internal consistency.
In the present study, Cronbach’s α for this measure was 0.72.
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured using Rosenberg’s Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965; Malay translation: Swami, 2012).
This is a 10-item measure that taps an individual’s self-worth (sam-
ple item: “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”). All items
were rated on a four-point Likert-type scale (1= strongly disagree,
4= strongly agree) and an overall score was computed by taking the
mean of all items. Five items were reverse-coded prior to analysis
and, for the Malay version, one item is allowed to load negatively
(for a discussion, see Swami, 2012). Higher scores on this scale
indicate higher self-esteem. The Malay version of this scale has
been shown to have adequate internal consistency, good test-retest
reliability after 5 weeks, and good patterns of validity. Cronbach’s
α for this measure was 0.73.
Satisfaction with life. The Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener
et al., 1985; Malay translation: Swami and Chamorro-Premuzic,
2009) was used to measure subjective life satisfaction (sample
item: “I am satisfied with my life”). The scale consists of five items
that were rated on a five-point Likert-type scale (1= strongly dis-
agree, 5= strongly agree). An overall score was computed as the
mean of all five items and higher scores indicate greater satisfac-
tion with life. The Malay version of this scale has been shown to
be one-dimensional, with good internal consistency (Swami and
Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009). In the present study, Cronbach’s α for
this measure was 0.82.
Demographics. Participants provided their demographic details
consisting of sex, age, religion, and highest educational
qualifications.
Procedure
Unless otherwise stated above, all measures were initially prepared
in English and were translated into Bahasa Malaysia (a standard-
ized form of Malay) using the back-translation method (Breslin,
1970). The author initially prepared Malay translations of the
scales, which were then back-translated into English by an inde-
pendent translator unaffiliated with the study. Disputed phrasing
was then settled by agreement between the author and the transla-
tor. All participants were recruited opportunistically from public
locations in Kuala Lumpur by a research assistant. Potential partic-
ipants were invited to take part in a study on political attitudes and,
upon agreement to participate,provided informed consent. Partic-
ipants completed a paper-and-pencil survey in a quiet location and
returned the survey to the research assistant in a sealed envelope.
The order of presentation of the above scales was randomized for
each participant. All data were treated confidentially and anony-
mously, and participants were provided with a debrief sheet once
they had returned their surveys. Participation was on a voluntary
basis and participants were not remunerated for participation.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In order to examine the factor structure of the novel belief in
the Jewish conspiracy theories scale, an exploratory factor analy-
sis was computed using varimax rotation. The number of factors
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to be extracted was determined by factor eigenvalues (λ) above
1.0, the scree-plot criterion (Cattell, 1966), and an extraction cri-
terion of 0.30 (Kline, 1986). The size of the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy, KMO= 0.92, and Bartlett’s test of
sphericity, χ2(66)= 3511.30, p< 0.001, indicated that the items
had adequate common variance for factor analysis (Tabachnick
and Fidell, 2007). A principal components analysis was, therefore,
conducted on all 12 items of the scale.
The results of the factor analysis indicated the existence of two
factors with λ> 1.0 after three iterations. However, the scree-plot
showed a steep decline between the first (λ= 4.67) and second
factors (λ= 2.89), and factor loadings indicated that all items
loaded on to the dominant factor (see Table 1), which explained
38.8% of the variance. Based on these results and the criteria indi-
cated above, the one-dimensional factor structure was preferred
over a two-factor solution. An overall score of belief in the Jew-
ish conspiracy theory was, therefore, calculated as the mean of
all 12 items. Cronbach’s α for this overall factor was very good
(0.94). An independent-samples t -test showed that there was no
significant difference between women and men on this measure,
t (366)= 0.41, p= 0.682, d = 0.04. Descriptive statistics for this
measure (reported in Table 2) indicated that participants’ mean
responses were around the mid-point of the scale.
To examine antecedents of belief in the Jewish conspiracy the-
ory, bivariate correlations were conducted between overall scores
as derived above and all remaining variables (general conspiracist
ideation, attitudes to authority, political cynicism, political alien-
ation, self-esteem, satisfaction with life, and participant age). As
can be seen in Table 2, belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was
significantly and positively correlated with general conspiracist
ideation, although the strength of the correlation was weak. Belief
in the Jewish conspiracy theory was also positively correlated with
participant age and political cynicism, although the strength of
these correlations was likewise weak. Belief in general conspiracy
theories was positively correlated with attitudes to authority and
political cynicism, and negatively correlated with participant age.
To examine the predictive strength of these associations, a mul-
tiple linear regression was conducted with belief in the Jewish
conspiracy theory as the criterion variable and all remaining fac-
tors as predictor variables. The overall regression was significant,
F(7, 367)= 9.69, p< 0.001,Adj. R2= 0.11, but the only significant
predictor was general conspiracist ideation (B= 0.08, SE= 0.04,
β= 0.12, t = 2.58, p= 0.010). When the regression analysis was
repeated with general conspiracist ideation as the criterion
variable, the regression was again significant, F(6, 367)= 4.11,
p= 0.001. The only significant predictors in this model were polit-
ical cynicism (B= 0.07, SE= 0.02, β= 0.17, t = 2.86, p= 0.004)
and participant age (B= −0.01, SE= 0.01, β=−0.12, t =−2.25,
p= 0.027).
Overall, the results of Study 1 provided only limited support
for the hypotheses. Although belief in the Jewish conspiracy the-
ory was significantly associated with general conspiracist ideation,
which supports the idea of a monological belief system, the associ-
ation was relatively weak. Furthermore, other measures of anomie
did not emerge as significant predictors of belief in the Jewish
conspiracy theory, which stands in contrast to the findings of
previous work. In terms of general belief in conspiracy theories,
the results indicated that politically cynical individuals were more
likely to hold stronger conspiracist beliefs. Again, however, the
association was weak and further variables associated with anomie
did not emerge as significant predictors. In short, the results of
Study 1 appear to suggest that measures of anomie are not strong
predictors of conspiracist ideation among Malaysian Malays.
STUDY 2
It is possible that the results of Study 1 reflect the fact that belief
in the Jewish conspiracy theory among Malaysian Malays stems,
not from feelings of powerlessness but rather from implicit resent-
ment toward ethnic minorities (particularly the Chinese), as well
explicit hostility toward Western secularism and cosmopolitanism
(Hadler, 2004). That is, rather than being monological in the sense
proposed by Goertzel (1994), belief in the Jewish conspiracy the-
ory may serve a specific ideological purpose within the Malaysian
geopolitical context. If this is the case, then the lack of significant
associations between belief in this conspiracy theory and measures
of anomie is unsurprising, as the conspiracy theory is not driven
by traditional feelings of powerlessness, disadvantage, or voice-
lessness (in fact, among some Malaysian Malays, it may be just the
opposite).
Table 2 | Associations between belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory and all other variables included in Study 1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory 0.22** 0.07 0.09 0.13* −0.02 0.05 0.18**
(2) General conspiracist ideation 0.17* 0.20** 0.06 −0.03 −0.03 −0.14*
(3) Attitudes to authority 0.36** 0.11* 0.07 0.10 0.13*
(4) Political cynicism 0.40** −0.02 −0.03 −0.11*
(5) Political alienation 0.09 0.10 −0.22**
(6) Self-esteem 0.50** 0.23**
(7) Satisfaction with life 0.19**
(8) Participant age
M 3.70 4.13 3.25 17.35 7.02 2.08 3.10 44.15
SD 1.91 1.40 0.50 3.50 1.44 0.48 0.76 12.90
N= 368. *p<0.05, **p<0.001.
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Study 2, therefore, sought to extend the findings of the first
study by examining the relationships between belief in the Jewish
conspiracy theory and a range of ideological variables. Specifi-
cally, this study included measures of right-wing authoritarianism
(a measure of support for traditional social norms and submis-
sion to authority), social dominance orientation (a measure of
preference for hierarchical social systems), anti-Israeli attitudes
(which has been argued to be a socially acceptable cover for hos-
tility toward Jews; Cohen et al., 2009), and a measure of modern
racism (adapted to refer to the Chinese). In addition, participants
also completed a measure of general conspiracist ideation, as in
Study 1, which allowed for a test of the relative strength of these
variables in predicting belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethical statement
The ethics committee at the Department of Psychology, University
of Westminster, specifically approved this study. All participants
provided written informed consent.
Participants
Participants of Study 2 were 162 women and 152 men of Malay
ancestry, recruited from Kuala Lumpur. Participants ranged in age
from 18 to 68 years (M = 40.89, SD= 13.04) and all were Mus-
lims. In terms of educational qualifications, 38.8% had completed
secondary education, 36.3% had a post-secondary diploma, 19.4%
had an undergraduate degree,and 5.4% had a postgraduate degree.
Materials
Belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory. Participants completed
the 12-item measure of belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory, as
described in Study 1. Based on the above results, an overall score
for this scale was computed as the mean of all 12 items. Cronbach’s
α for this scale in Study 2 was 0.90.
General conspiracist ideation. Participants completed the Belief
in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (Swami et al., 2010, 2011), as
described in Study 1. Cronbach’s α for this measure was 0.88.
Right-wing authoritarianism. To measure authoritarianism, the
short form of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Zakrisson,
2005) was used. This is a 15-item short version of the original 30-
item measure (Altemeyer, 1988) and measures the degree to which
an individual supports traditional social norms and submission to
authority. (Sample item: “Our country needs a powerful leader, in
order to destroy the radical and immoral currents prevailing in
society today.”) All items were rated on a seven-point Likert-type
scale (1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree) and an overall score
was computed as the mean of all 15 items. Higher scores on this
scale provide an index of greater right-wing authoritarianism. The
short form of this scale has good psychometric properties (Zakris-
son, 2005). In the present study, Cronbach’s α for this measure
was 0.86.
Social dominance orientation. The 16-item Social Dominance
Orientation Scale (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) was used to mea-
sure an individual’s preference for hierarchical social systems and
desire for one’s social group to dominate over others. (Sample item:
“To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other
groups.”) All items were rated on a seven-point Likert-type scale
(1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree) and an overall score was
computed as the mean of all 16 items. Higher scores on this scale
indicate greater social dominance orientation. Sidanius and Pratto
(1999) provide evidence of the scale’s psychometric properties. In
this study, Cronbach’s α for this measure was 0.89.
Attitudes toward Israel. Cohen et al. (2009) devised the Attitudes
toward Israel Scale, a 10-item measure, to measure an individ-
ual’s pro-Israeli sentiment. (Sample item: “I strongly support the
Israeli cause.”) All items were rated on a five-point Likert-type
scale (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree) and an overall score
was computed as the mean of all items. Higher scores on this scale
reflect more pro-Israeli attitudes. Cohen et al. (2009) reported that
the measure has good internal consistency, which was also the case
in the present study (Cronbach’s α= 0.92).
Modern racism. This study included the Modern Racism Scale
(McConahay et al., 1981; McConahay, 1983, 1986), which mea-
sures an individual’s degree of ethnic prejudice. The scale has been
successfully adapted to different target groups (e.g., Echebarria-
Echabe and Guede, 2007) and in the present study, the six-item
measure was adapted to refer to the Chinese. (Sample item:
“Over the past few years, the government and news media have
shown more respect for the Chinese than they deserve.”) All
items were rated on a five-point Likert-type scale (1= strongly
disagree, 5= strongly agree) and an overall score was computed as
the mean of all items. Higher scores on this scale reflect greater
prejudice toward the Chinese. The original version of the scale has
been shown to have good psychometric properties (McConahay
et al., 1981). In the present study, Cronbach’s α for this measure
was 0.82.
Demographics. Participants provided their demographic details
consisting of sex, age, religion, and highest educational
qualifications.
Procedure
The procedures of Study 2 were identical to those of Study 1, with
the exception that participation was limited to those who had not
taken part in Study 1.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics for, and bivariate correlations between, all
variables included in Study 2 are reported in Table 3. As can be
seen, stronger belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory was signifi-
cantly associated with more anti-Israeli attitudes, higher racism,
greater social dominance orientation, greater right-wing authori-
tarianism, stronger belief in general conspiracy theories, and older
age. The correlations were strongest for attitudes toward Israel
and modern racism and weakest for general conspiracist ideation.
Belief in general conspiracy theories was significantly and nega-
tively correlated with right-wing authoritarianism, social domi-
nance orientation, and participant age (Rs=−0.14 to−0.20), but
none of the other variables.
To examine the predictive strength of these associations, a mul-
tiple linear regression was conducted with belief in the Jewish
conspiracy theory as the criterion variable and all remaining
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Table 3 | Associations between belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory and all other variables included in Study 2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory 0.17* 0.33** 0.37** −0.52** 0.50** 0.17*
(2) General conspiracist ideation −0.20** −0.22** −0.06 0.02 −0.14*
(3) Right-wing authoritarianism 0.36** −0.26* 0.50** 0.19*
(4) Social dominance orientation −0.33** 0.47** 0.22**
(5) Attitudes toward Israel −0.27** 0.07
(6) Modern racism 0.19**
(7) Age
M 3.77 4.01 3.78 3.99 1.12 3.92 40.89
SD 1.91 1.38 0.46 1.20 0.50 0.87 13.04
*p<0.05, **p<0.001.
factors as predictor variables. The overall regression was
significant, F(6, 313)= 34.17, p< 0.001, Adj. R2= 0.39. Of the
variables entered into the model, the strongest predictor was atti-
tudes toward Israel (B=−0.68, SE= 0.06, β=−0.56, t =−12.14,
p< 0.001). Other variables that emerged as significant predic-
tors were modern racism (B= 0.07, SE= 0.01, β= 0.17, t = 4.76,
p< 0.001), right-wing authoritarianism (B= 0.02, SE= 0.01,
β= 0.15, t = 3.12, p= 0.002), and social dominance orientation
(B= 0.02, SE= 0.01, β= 0.14, t = 3.00, p= 0.006). General con-
spiracist ideation and participant age did not emerge as significant
predictors in this analysis.
The results of Study 2 indicate that belief in the Jewish conspir-
acy theory among Malaysian Malays was significantly associated
with anti-Israeli attitudes, modern racism directed at Chinese,
right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation.
When these ideological variables had been accounted for, general
conspiracist ideation did not emerge as a significant predictor.
Overall, these results suggest that belief in the Jewish conspiracy
theory may serve particular ideological needs rather than con-
form to a monological belief system, at least among the present
sample. That is, the Jewish conspiracy theory may not be viewed
in the same way as other conspiracy theories, but rather appears to
reflect specific political expressions within a particular geopolitical
context.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the present studies suggest that, in the Malaysian
context, belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory may only be weakly
associated with belief in other conspiracy theories. Rather, belief
in this conspiracist, anti-Semitic narrative appears to serve ide-
ological demands and needs that may be more pronounced in
the Malaysian context. For example, various authors have noted
the upsurge of anti-Jewish rhetoric among politically conserva-
tive Malaysians, motivated in part by the question of Palestine,
but also broader concerns about the threat from secularism, cos-
mopolitanism, globalization, and capitalism. In this context, the
Jewish conspiracy theory should be viewed through the lens of the
particular geopolitical context in Malaysia, especially in relation
to the resurgence of political Islam and Muslim victimhood (Reid,
2010).
Interestingly, the results of Study 2 also indicate that belief in
the Jewish conspiracy theory was associated with prejudice toward
the Chinese. Several scholars have suggested that, in Malaysia,
anti-Jewish rhetoric may represent an implicit attack on the Chi-
nese, particularly Chinese commerce and business elites (Hadler,
2004). Because explicitly targeting the Chinese is both illegal
and politically unwise, the Jewish conspiracy theory may offer
a means of expressing an anti-Chinese polemic that would oth-
erwise remain suppressed (Reid, 2010). That is, to the extent
that explicit anti-Chinese rhetoric must remain hidden, the anti-
Jewish conspiracy theory provides a crude tool for the expres-
sion of racist sentiment. In a political climate marked by the
exploitation of race for political ends, but in which explicitly anti-
Chinese rhetoric must remain hidden, conspiracy theories about
the Jews may serve particular ideological needs (Hadler, 2004;
Reid, 2010).
It is also interesting to note that, in Study 1,belief in general con-
spiracy theories was significantly predicted by political cynicism,
but not other measures of anomie. Moreover, Study 2 showed that
belief in general conspiracy theories was significantly associated
with right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orien-
tation, albeit weakly. These results stands in contrast to previous
findings among Western samples, which indicate that belief in con-
spiracy theories is significantly associated with measures of anomie
(Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Swami et al., 2010,
2011). Additionally, the negative association between belief in gen-
eral conspiracy theories and right-wing authoritarianism appears
to be stronger in the present study than has been reported among
central European participants (Swami et al., 2012a). In short, the
present results provide preliminary support for the suggestion that
conspiracist ideation may play different roles in different cultural
contexts.
As Gray (2008, p. 167) has discussed,“There is no single theory
of conspiracism that simply and neatly can explain conspiracism,
much less one that can be taken from the Western experience and
superimposed onto [other cultures] to explain both the breadth
and frequency of conspiracy discourse.” Rather, when seeking to
evaluate belief in conspiracy theories in specific national con-
texts, it will be important for scholars to carefully consider the
uniqueness of the local political, economic, and cultural climate.
Certainly, the present study suggests that explanations related
to anomie and powerlessness may be insufficient to explain the
maintenance and spread of conspiracy theories in Malaysia. Of
course, this is not to suggest that the study of conspiracism in the
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West will not be beneficial for understanding it in other cultural
contexts. Rather, accumulating evidence suggests that there may
be limits to the applicability and transferability of the former onto
the latter (Gray, 2008).
Nevertheless, this discussion of cultural specificity should be
interpreted with some caution. For one thing, previous studies
of conspiracist ideation among Western samples have tended to
focus on conspiracy theories that tend to be stigmatized or out-
side the mainstream, which contrasts with the ubiquity of the
Jewish conspiracy theory among Malaysian Malays. As such, it is
quite possible that more mainstream conspiracy theories in the
West will also show similar patterns of antecedents as the Jewish
conspiracy theory in Malaysia. In short, more work is needed to
ascertain the extent to which there is a cultural gap in the socio-
political functions of conspiracism in the West. In a similar vein,
it would also be useful to further explore whether, or the extent to
which, the relationship between the Jewish conspiracy theory and
ant-Chinese sentiment among Malaysian Malays in fact reflects a
more generalized reaction that views any outsider as having sinister
motives.
This study is also not without other limitations. Socially desir-
able responding is a real concern, particularly as participants may
not have wished to disclose politically or socially sensitive infor-
mation (despite the steps taken, such as assurances of anonymity).
In addition, the opportunistic method of sampling means that
the present results may not be generalizable to the wider Malay
public. Indeed, and conversely, the present set of results may
represent phenomena that are specific to Malaysian Malays, and
future studies would do well to replicate these results in other cul-
tural settings. For example, it is unclear whether the same pattern
of results would be found in Western settings where anti-Semitic
sentiments are more culturally circumscribed than in Malaysia.
Furthermore, although steps were taken to ensure that the scales
used in the present study were appropriately back-translated, it is
possible that translational issues affected the present set of find-
ings. Finally, future studies could include further variables that
were neglected in the present work, such as religiosity (which may
be particularly important given the issue of Muslim victimhood
and its relevance to belief in the Jewish conspiracy theory).
Even so, the present results raise important questions about
the nature and functions of anti-Jewish conspiracy theories in
the Malaysian context. It would appear that, among Malaysian
Malays at least, the Jewish conspiracy theory serves specific ide-
ological functions that are distinct from other conspiracy theo-
ries. More broadly, the present findings suggest that anti-Jewish
rhetoric among Malaysian Malays should not be dismissed as
a marginal phenomenon. Rather, it would appear that, as the
Jewish conspiracy is espoused by politicians and the mainstream
media, boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable political
discourse becomes blurred (for a similar discussion concerning
Yugoslavia, see Byford and Billig, 2001). In this context, there is
an urgent need to more carefully locate the ideological functions
served by such conspiracy theories and to begin the difficult task
of combating anti-Jewish and other racist rhetoric.
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